The central question in this study is whether the power of the media agenda over the political agenda has recently increased. The agenda-building dynamics are established using crosscountry time-series data on four issues, covering fifteen and eight years respectively of British and Dutch parliamentary debates and newspaper articles. Structural equation models show that the parliamentary agenda is more influenced by the media agenda than the other way around, and that the power balance has shifted even more in favour of the media. We additionally find that media power is especially associated with issues within the European domain. Our study contributes empirically to the 'mediatization' debate in a EU context, which is largely limited to the realm of theoretical speculation.
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to deliver solutions quickly. 25 They aim at taking the lead in public discussion, 26 which means defining the terms through which the issue is understood. Politicians are eager to withhold this instrument of power from their opponents, as well as from 'investigative' journalists.
Paradoxically, the wish to take the lead results in adjusting issue priorities to the taste of the media for conflict, drama and horse race. 27 Second, the political arena does not form an airtight unity; rather, media scoops can often be traced to lack of loyalty or competition from within the political system, rather than to masterly journalism. If issues enter the public domain prematurely, politicians must look for ad hoc solutions, in order to satisfy both media and voters. 28 Third, media's reliance on their values of news production makes for choices and interpretations that are not always in the politician's best interest. Since political actors often disagree about issue priorities, the media are enabled to focus on controversial issues that are expected to deliver a continuing stream of political conflicts and political drama.
Empirical support for media dominance can already be found in the Langs'
Watergate study, where they address the role of obtrusive and continuous issues. 29 Studies the time of transaction?' 33 When drawing up the balance on the basis of agenda-building literature, with evidence either in favour of parliamentary or media control, the debate about the distribution of power turns out to be inconclusive. It suggests that agenda building leaves room for media influence, beside parliamentary control, thus giving rise to hypothesis one.
H1
Not only does the parliamentary agenda influence the media agenda, but the parliamentary agenda is also influenced by the media agenda.
Mediatization
Mediatization of the political debate implies either politicians' increased responsiveness to media caprices or politicians' loss of monopoly over news coverage. It can easily be expressed in terms of agenda building:
H2
The influence of the media agenda on the parliamentary agenda has increased relative to the influence in the reverse direction.
Speculations on the mediatization of politics are widespread, 34 but empirical evidence lags behind. Four groups of arguments pertaining to modern societies will be discussed here.
First, the ICT revolution has led to almost hourly news scoops and deadlines. The news becomes old hat sooner, tempting politicians to give up their own agenda and link up with the news of the day to remain newsworthy. Second, with the emergence of liberalized and competitive news markets, a party logic gave way to a media logic. No longer can news organizations spend the lion's share of their resources on tiresome and complex politics.
proactive or audacious journalist. 35 Third, ideology has retreated from citizens' everyday lives. The traditional links of loyalty between parties and news organizations have shrunk, as have the opportunities for politicians to reach voters in terms of time, space and sound bites.
Since voters increasingly rely on the media to make political choices, so do politicians.
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The three trends highlighted above are intertwined causes of the emergence of a new journalistic practice, labelled 'interpretative' 37 or 'pragmatic' 38 reporting. Prudence, respect and integral reporting typified journalists' 'sacerdotal' approach to politicians, which still prevailed in the 1980s. 39 The political agenda was the central point of reference for the daily news agenda. 40 According to the interpretative style, only the criteria of news selection determine whether an issue will turn into a story. This means less attention enjoyed by politicians and more journalistic commentary. To ensure the attention of an audience, while posing as critical watchdogs, journalists dwell on scandals and conflicts.
Fourth, institutional changes that weaken the formal power of national politicians will decrease their efficacy to build the media agenda. We refer to the theoretical perspective of 'multilevel governance', which describes European integration as a process of central states transferring parts of both their formal decision-making authority and actual policy-making 47 One should be aware that these studies evaluate the political impact of (1) the tone, and not the agenda, of the news, and (2) This idea that especially politicians who are fully in charge feel entitled to put pressure on the media agenda, while journalists readily follow, will become manifest in different distributions of power across different issues.
H4
Especially for issues with a strong European dimension, media agenda-building power increases vis-à-vis parliamentary agenda-building power.
Note that we do not expect a total elimination of the national parliamentary agenda. There is less academic disagreement about the choice of the media agenda.
Newspapers are used here. Still, the argument that television is a more important medium, is an often-heard one. This argument is especially relevant for studies about media effects and public opinion. A study aiming at media effects and politics depends less on the reach of a medium than on its reputation. Moreover, the correlation between issues in TV news and issues in the press, as well as the correlation among newspapers, is extremely high.
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British parliamentary documents have been digitally available for longer than the Dutch archives. This is unfortunate but unproblematic, since the period of research still 55 Symbolic agendas include all political forums intended for the communication or deliberation of political viewpoints, whereas substantive agendas include actual policy measures. 56 The argument of Walgrave and Van Aelst expresses our reason for not working with party press releases, a common indicator for the political agenda. Moreover, in many countries party press releases are too irregular to allow for a time-series analysis.
57 Kleinnijenhuis, 'Het Publiek Volgt Media die de Politiek Volgen'.
coincides, as it should, with the aforementioned societal trends, enabling the trends towards mediatization and agenda convergence to be revealed. The interpretative style forced its way into British journalism as early as the 1980s, whereas it took another decade for its first signs to show in Dutch journalism, due to the heritage of pillarisation and the late arrival of media competition. 58 The timing of European key events 59 prescribes a research period encompassing the 1990s and the turn of the millennium, which is covered by both data sets.
British debates and newspaper articles were collected from 22-11-1988 to 31-12-2003. 60 Three national quality newspapers with a high circulation and a different political outlook were chosen: the Times (liberal conservative), the Guardian (social democrat) and the Independent (liberal democrat). 62 Dutch debates were obtained from the publishing house for government documentation, SDU.
63 British debates were integrally downloaded. Dutch debates were selected according to the SDU classification system based on policy domains. Relevance was established afterwards by checking for the presence of the same search terms as used for article selection.
do not consist of such sections, the number of days on which the issues were discussed is a more meaningful unit: 2,349 days of British debates and 333 days of Dutch debates.
INFORMATION EXTRACTION BY MEANS OF AUTOMATED CONTENT ANALYSIS
Computers lack the ability to interpret and judge for themselves. A design for automated content analysis requires the theoretical concepts to be translated into precise categories of semantically related words that correspond as accurately as possible to actual occurrences.
Our theoretical model includes one central concept: the agenda. It is defined as the amount of attention paid to an issue within one time unit. In turn, attention is made operative as the number of textual occurrences of any issue-specific keyword.
To define the issues, a hierarchical list of keywords was drawn up, covering each issue as exhaustively as possible. 65 Since a computer does not know how to distinguish between keyword occurrences in different semantic contexts, the keywords were linked to disambiguation criteria to avoid incorrect occurrences in the scores of attention. These disambiguation criteria prescribe that a keyword should only be counted when it occurs simultaneously with semantically related keywords in a context unit (either the document as a whole, or a 'ramped window' of, for example, 30 or 5 words).
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Whereas these criteria aim at excluding incorrect keyword occurrences within relevant documents, there should also be checks for relevance aimed at the documents that are included erroneously. First, a random selection of the documents was manually examined to see whether the subjects indeed pertained to one of the four issues. As a 64 The difference in numbers is due to the fact that the Dutch SDU selected debates in which an issue was the primary subject, whereas the British debates were selected if one search term was mentioned.
The British debates include more peripheral hits. Such lack of correspondence matters little to the results, since the score for attention is not dichotomous, but increases with the number of keyword hits per article. Hence, debates with only peripheral issue relevance hardly contribute to the final scores.
result, the original search terms were refined by adding restrictions to the terms that appeared too ambiguous (filter 1). Second, a filter was applied to media data to delete articles that were positioned in, for example, the sports and entertainment sections of the newspaper (filter 2). Such forms of fiction seldom reflect current political discussion.
Custom-made software was used to transform the raw documents to a uniform input format (xml), to search all documents for the presence of the keywords, and count the relevant hits. 67 In the case of newspapers, the sum of the number of hits in the article's body and twice the number of hits in the headline or leader was calculated. This decision is based on the assumption that a keyword in a headline or leader indicates special commitment to the issue. Due to the lack of comparable structure in the debates, every such hit was treated equally. The square roots of the scores were used to decrease the influence of outliers on statistical tests and to render variables with a more 'normal' distribution. 68 Both the media and political data are skewed. Box-Cox-tests, based on the transformation x' = log(x λ -1) / λ, showed that the optimal λ is λ =.40 and λ =.37 for the British and Dutch political agendas respectively, and λ =.02 and λ =.12 for their media agendas. The common solution of a logtransformation, (x'=log(x+1)/log(2), which equals λ =0 in the Box-Cox transformation), would reduce the skewness too much. We opted for a uniform square root transformation (λ=0.5) for all agendas.
even within a single time period. 70 Because comparisons between models for different nations, issues and periods are required to test our hypotheses, the models should be parsimonious. Inductive models such as VAR models use large numbers of parameters to fit the peculiarities of the data, which are simply irrelevant to test hypotheses of a comparative nature, while still not offering tests of reciprocal influence.
Let us immediately acknowledge, however, that the hypotheses to be tested do not specify the precise time dynamics involved in the agenda-building process. Therefore, inductive modelling techniques were used in an exploratory fashion to uncover the time lags of reciprocal influence that our SEM models should take into account. VAR models gave us a priori knowledge about a plausible lag length, potential seasonality in the time series, and the number of lags to incorporate in the SEM models.
A thorny question is whether the parliament-media interactions should be modelled with daily, weekly, monthly or even yearly data. Although MPs and journalists interact on a daily basis, they are not always able to respond instantaneously, due to a variety of constraints such as other hot news and the inertia of political institutions. MPs cannot interrogate the government on every issue every day, because of the pre-determined parliamentary agenda, for instance. These common-sense considerations to limit the range of possible time units to weekly and monthly units match the empirical results from the few longitudinal agenda-building analyses available. 71 Here we took advantage of the exploratory power of VAR models to arrive at an informed choice between weekly and monthly data. Table 1 ). With monthly data (one time lag), the null hypothesis of a unit root in the agendas was consistently rejected at the 1% level of significance (once at the 5% level). It was thus unnecessary to difference the data to render them stationary: there is no deterministic trend or seasonality in the data that interferes with parameter estimation.
73 The residuals of VAR-models based on weekly and monthly data were compared on remaining serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey) and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (Engle's ARCH). We compared weekly and monthly data with one lag and a yearly seasonal lag (of 52 weeks, or 12 months). Moving from weekly to monthly data reduced the number of series with negative serial autocorrelation in the residuals. ARCH disappeared in all but two of the series with monthly data.
Informed by the short-term causality and yearly seasonality in the monthly VAR models, an initial parsimonious SEM model is easily given, with assumed dominance of instantaneous causality as the point of departure:
The parliamentary agenda is indicated by 'parl', 'med' is the media agenda, '(t)' at present time, '(t-1)' with a lag of one month, '(t-12)' with a lag of 12 months. Including the yearly lag (t-12) in the SEM models controls for seasonality in the data as was detected by the VAR models, but not included in the Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests of monthly data. We used the program LISREL 8 to provide maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters a to f. 
Next, influences that appeared insignificant on the basis of their t-values were deleted from the models. 76 It turned out that this modelling strategy always converged in a single model regarding the crossover influences, i.e. instantaneous causation rather than cross-lagged causation. 
RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS
A first general remark to be made is that the model estimates exhibit a clear yearly pattern in the parliamentary agenda, while the media agenda shows a stronger short-term autoregression. To put it differently, politicians behave like old watchdogs that return to their homes, whereas the media resemble a pack of hounds that briefly follow their interests of the day. In this section we will concentrate on the question 'who influences whom', rather than on the time-variant structure of the influence process. Overall, the model fit is very satisfactory in all cases with CFI near to 1, RMSEA smaller than 0.05 and a p-value higher than 0.05 (see Table 2 ).
Overall agenda building (H1) -On account of the first hypothesis that agenda building involves both parliamentary and media influence, figure 3 visualizes the overall British and Dutch agenda-building processes respectively, tested over the whole research period, taking the four issues together.
Figure 3 about here please
There is room for significant flows of crossover influence in both countries, despite the considerable degree of independence displayed by both actors. Clearly, though, parliament and the press do not treat each other as the ultimate source for their agendas, signified by the modest crossover coefficients. The flows of influence are indeed bi-directional in the United Kingdom, with a dominant media agenda. In the Netherlands there is no question of a balance of power in which both parties are represented. The Dutch media agenda is the only agenda that seems to matter. The models already indicate the independence and power (or rather the lack thereof) of the British and Dutch national democratic institutions, which at the same time touches on an inherent agenda-building question; which agenda is the dominant one? In both countries the answer tends towards the media agenda.
Agenda building in time (H2) -Has mediatization left its footprints in agenda
building? We move on to assess whether the balance of power is stable over time or whether British and Dutch media have tightened their grip on the parliamentary agenda. Table 2 about here please
In Table 2 the results for the British agenda-building process in periods one, two and three can be found. In the early days, we already see a considerable media influence on parliament (b media =0.15, p=0.53, RMSEA=0.00), with no parliamentary influence at all. In the second period, media dominance has increased (b media =0.19, p=0.67, RMSEA=0.00), which is reinforced in period three. Significant parliamentary influence is absent in all models.
British MPs seem highly and increasingly sensitive to the daily whims of the media, while journalists take no notice of the interests of these politicians.
Turning to the Dutch situation, the trend points in the same direction, but the shift is more pronounced. During the period 1995 up to 1999, parliament and the media manifest no mutual interest whatsoever (Table 2) . From 2000 onwards, the media have seized power over parliament, while the reverse influence remains absent. Parliament has become highly responsive to events that appear in the news.
The increase in media's agenda-building power is statistically significant in both p<0.001, RMSEA=0.17) . In both countries, the results for the issues of agriculture and drugs confirm our expectations that the media do not have as much grip on the parliamentary agenda of domestic issues as on the parliamentary agenda of European issues. In the UK, both EU issues (agriculture and environment) display media dominance, whereas every trace of influence vanishes for the issue of drugs. Still, the British parliament fails to set the media agenda on this domestic issue. The Dutch media largely instigate public discussion on agriculture, whereas it is parliament that convincingly initiates drugs discussions.
The results of the Dutch environment are not in line with hypothesis 4. Since it is a EU issue, we expected a strong media. However, parliamentary influence is exceptionally strong. The earlier described chronology tells us that key events largely concerned domestic matters, such as the parliamentary enquiry (1998/1999) RWCs, but this does not prevent parliament from reacting to the news. As far as immigration goes, it is now safe to argue that our findings of media dominance do not concern a spurious relationship that should really be seen as an artefact of the influence of real-world events on both agendas. Since the impact of RWCs on the other three issues was not tested, our conclusions about those balances of power might be undermined after all. However, since even a RWC as asylum applications, which is so central to the policy area of immigration, does not account for any of the media's autonomous effect on the parliamentary agenda, we deem it highly unlikely that controlling for any other RWC will wipe out the equally significant flows of influence (in whatever direction) in the other three cases.
Discussion
Much literature is devoted to the omnipresence of the media in modern society and the possible trivialization of politics. In this study we bring a uniquely extensive dataset to the fore to empirically test whether media control over parliament has expanded in recent times.
These data comprise parliamentary debates and newspaper articles on the issues of agriculture, environment, drugs and immigration, covering a period of fifteen years for the United Kingdom and eight years for the Netherlands. While many agenda-building studies are theoretical assessments, and empirical studies use longitudinal data to reconstruct agenda building as a 'once and for all' model, we applied longitudinal and cross-sectional data to also assess shifts through time, as well as differences across countries and issues.
In line with the first hypothesis we find that media influence on the parliamentary agenda is undeniable. While the agendas exert a mutual influence in the UK, the Dutch media agenda is not controlled by the parliamentary agenda. The second hypothesis, which predicts that the power balance has shifted in favour of the media agenda, was also convincingly confirmed. Both British and Dutch media gained considerable control over the parliamentary agenda, while parliament remained powerless. scrutinize our governments, are not only under the spell of the media, but are also failing to control the national executives.
This study has demonstrated that national parliaments exert remarkably little control over the public debate. The media are now pulling the strings even more than a decade earlier. They seem to gain power over parliament's priorities when the issues discussed move away from the domestic level and embrace an amount of European interference.
Apparently, the media are prepared to follow national politicians when their competence and status are unchallenged, but inclined to take the lead when politics is merely symbolic. Note. To improve the legibility of the graphs, they were based on a log transformation of the original time series. Note. 'P' and 'M' are the parliamentary and media agenda respectively. The brackets behind the coefficients indicate the lag that is associated with the coefficients (t-1 or t-12). * indicates statistical significance at p<.05 (twosided, t>1.96); **: p<0.01 (two-sided, t>2.58); -indicates the lack of a significant flow of influence. R Note. x indicates that the relationship was not tested; -indicates the lack of a significant flow of influence.
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